Drone and Cyber Attacks at Airports by our Adversaries cannot be ruled out. Concerned Agencies Need to Act and be alert and vigilant.

It is reported that India’s Airport Security is unprepared for dangerous enemies in the sky. In the age when drones across the border can unleash terror, India’s Airport security is not equipped. The Bureau of Civil Aviation Security had issued an order earlier for a time-bound deployment of drone interception technology at all the airports across the country. After nine months, not a single airport in India is equipped with the technology. In the year 2019, an on Annual Anti-Terror Conference of the National Investigation Agency with all the stakeholders including the law enforcement agencies of states, the issue of criminal drones, or the drones that can be deployed for any kind of criminal activity was discussed.

Our Civil Airports are a soft target and attacks using Drones is a serious threat. China is almost a Drone Super Power and can indulge in some kind of Drone attacks or interference through Drones in connivance with Pakistan. Hence, it is essential that immediate steps are taken to neutralise such threats before they reach anywhere close to striking distance.

Another Major threat which is looming large is the Cyber Attack on the communication and Navigation system at the airports by our adversaries or rogue elements. We are hopeful  that this threat has been analysed and appreciated by Cyber Security Agencies of the country  and they must be working overtime to face this challenge.

Altimeter Settings Awareness and Pitfalls

 Introduction

Incorrect altimeter setting and lack of awareness among Pilots about the importance of correct altimeter setting has caused many accidents or near accidents.

The aircraft/Helicopter altimeter barometric sub-scale must be set to the appropriate setting for the phase of flight. Failure to set the appropriate barometric sub-scale pressure setting may result in a significant deviation from the cleared altitude or Flight Level

Flight level. Standard pressure setting (1013 hPa) is set when flying by reference to flight levels above the transition altitude;

Altitude. Regional or airfield pressure setting (QNH) is set when flying by reference to altitude above mean sea level below the transition level;

Height. Altimeter pressure setting indicating height above airfield or touchdown (QFE) is set when approaching to land at airfield where this procedure is in use.

Types of Altimeter Setting Error

The pilot mishears the transmitted pressure setting and sets an incorrect figure.

The pilot hears the transmitted pressure setting correctly but fails to set it or mis-sets it.

The pilot fails to change the pressure setting at the appropriate point in a departure, climb, descent or approach.

Effects

Failure to set the appropriate pressure setting can result in deviation from the cleared altitude or flight level leading to level bust, loss of separation from other traffic, and even collision with other aircraft or with the ground (CFIT).

Loss of situational awareness due to failure to appreciate the significance of a pressure setting (especially QFE as opposed to QNH). This can result in incorrect appreciation of the closeness of the ground possibly leading to an unstabilised approach or collision with the ground (CFIT).

Defences

Effective SOPs contained in company flight operations manuals which specify appropriate procedures for the setting and cross-checking of altimeter barometric sub scales.

Strict adherence to the verification of pressure-altitude-derived level procedure by ATC. This should be done at least once by each suitably equipped ATC unit. The check is performed by comparing the level received from surveillance sources with a voice report by the pilot.

System support – the Transponder always transmits the level information as flight level, regardless of the pressure setting. The ground system then converts this information to altitude/height.

Pilot Errors

A pilot fails to ensure that standard pressure is set when passing the transition altitude in the climb, and levels the aircraft at a flight level which differs from the cleared level by an amount dependent on the difference between the QNH and 1013 hPa.

A pilot fails to set QNH when passing the transition level in the descent and levels the aircraft at an altitude which differs from the cleared altitude by an amount dependent on the difference between QNH and 1013 hPa.

A pilot un-used to landing with QFE set, does not remember that the altimeter now indicates height above airfield elevation or touch-down zone.

Solutions

The existence of appropriate SOPs for the setting and cross-checking of altimeter sub scales and their strict observance is the only universal primary solution to eliminate incorrect altimeter setting.

Use of the aircraft radio altimeter to monitor the aircraft proximity with the ground can help to improve situational awareness provided that the flight crew are generally familiar with the terrain over which they are flying;

GPWS/GPWS/TAWS provide a safety net against CFIT and, in the case of TAWS Class ‘A’ with its option of a simple terrain mapping display, it can also be used to directly improve routine situational awareness.

Radio-altimeter Callouts

Radio-altimeter callouts can be either:

Announced (verbalized) by the PNF or the Flight Engineer.

Automatically generated by a synthesized voice (e.g., smart callouts).

Callouts should be tailored to the operating policy of the Operator and to the type of approach.

To enhance the flight crew’s terrain awareness, a callout “Radio altimeter alive”, should be announced by the first crewmember observing the radio altimeter activation at 2500 ft height AGL.

The radio altimeter reading should then be included in the instrument scanning for the remainder of the approach.

Radio altimeter readings (i.e., feet’s AGL) below the Minimum Obstacle Clearance (MOC) values listed below, should alert the flight crew

Initial approach segment (i.e., from IAF to IF) : 1000 ft;

Intermediate approach segment (i.e., from IF to FAF): 500 ft.

Final approach segment (i.e., after FAF, for non-precision approaches with a defined FAF, until visual references or reaching MAP) : 250 ft.

Unless the airport features high close-in terrain, the radio-altimeter reading (i.e., height

AGL) should reasonably agree with the height above airfield elevation (i.e., height AFE),

Obtained by:

Direct reading of the altimeter, if using QFE; or,

By subtracting the airport elevation from the altitude reading, if using QNH.

Operational and Human Factors Involved in Altimeter-setting Errors

The incorrect setting of the altimeter reference often is the result of one or more of

the following factors:

High workload;

Deviation from normal task sharing.

Interruptions and distractions.

Absence of effective cross-check and backup between crewmembers.

The analysis of incident / accident reports identify the following operational and human factors as causes of or contributing factors to altimeter-setting errors.

Incomplete briefings (i.e., failure to discuss the applicable altimeter-setting unit and the country practice for fixed or variable transitions altitudes / levels);

Workload during descent / approach.

Distraction / interruption;

Language difficulties (unfamiliar accents, speaking pace, unclear contraction of words, mixed English / local language communications)

Failure to cross-check altimeter-setting information (e.g., ATIS versus TWR messages, PF / PNF cross-check).

Fatigue;

Confusion between altimeter-setting units (i.e., in.Hg or hPa);

Excessive number of instructions given by ATC in a single message.

Confusion between numbers such as 5 and 9 (i.e., if 9 is pronounced as nine

instead of niner); and/or, Incorrect listening associated with ineffective read back / hear back loop (.

Flight Operations Briefing Note on Effective Pilot / Controller Communications).

 

 

Prevention Strategies and Personal Lines-of-Defence

Adherence to the defined task sharing (for normal or abnormal / emergency conditions) and the use of normal checklists are the most effective lines-of-defences against altimeter-setting errors.

Altimeter-setting errors often result in a lack of vertical situational awareness;

The following key points should be considered by pilots to minimize altimeter-setting

errors and to optimize the setting of the barometric-altimeter MDA(H) / DA(H) or radio-altimeter DH:

Awareness of the altimeter setting unit in use at the destination airport.

Awareness of rapid QNH / QFE changes due to prevailing weather conditions (i.e., extreme cold or warm fronts, steep frontal surfaces, semi-permanent or seasonal low pressure areas).

Awareness of the anticipated altimeter setting, using two independent sources for cross-check (e.g., METAR and ATIS messages).

Effective PF/PNF crosscheck and backup.

Adherence to SOPs for Sterile-cockpit rule during taxi, take off and descent-approach phases;

Change of barometric-altimeters setting in climb and descent:-

  • In climb: at the transition altitude; and,
  • In descent: when approaching the transition level and when cleared to an altitude.
  • Use of standby-altimeter to cross-check main altimeters.

Altitude callouts (e.g., approach-fix crossing altitudes) including the radio-altimeter in the instrument scan, when the radio-altimeter is “alive” (i.e., below 2500 ft RA) radio-altimeter callouts.

Setting the barometric-altimeter MDA (H) or DA (H) or the radio-altimeter DH.

Exercising extra vigilance and cross-check if QFE is used for approach and landing.

The following prevention strategies should be considered by air traffic controllers:

Limiting the number of instructions transmitted in a given message.

Indicating all the numbers and the unit defining the altimeter setting.

Adhering to the standard phraseology and pronunciation.

Adopting the accepted terminology “Low” before a 28.XX in.Hg altimeter setting and

High” before a 30.XX in.Hg altimeter setting.

Surat Airport gearing up for holistic development with world-class facilities

 

Airports Authority of India (AAI) is extensively working towards the holistic development of the Surat Airport with a project cost of Rs 353 crore. The building will have five aerobridges.

New Delhi: Surat, the financial capital of Gujarat and hub for diamond and textile business in India attracts air travellers in large numbers from across the world and India. In fact, Surat Airport has witnessed one of the highest passenger traffic growth in the recent past. Surat Airport’s air traffic has grown around 600% from 2016-17 to 2018-19.

Considering the significant rise in passenger traffic in the last few years, Airports Authority of India (AAI) is extensively working towards the holistic development of the Surat Airport with a project cost of Rs 353 crore. This development project includes the extension of the existing terminal building from 8,474 sqm to 25,520 sqm.

Salient features of the developed terminal building:

Equipped with all modern passenger amenities, the developed terminal building will have 20 check-in counters.

The building will have five aerobridges, In-Line baggage handling system, five conveyor belts for arriving passengers

There will be car parking for 475 cars.

In addition to the extension of the current terminal building, the expansion of Apron from five parking bays to 23 Parking bays and construction of parallel taxi track (2,905 m X 30 m) work has also commenced. After completion of the project next year in December, the new state-of-the-art extended terminal building will be capable of handling 1,200 domestic and 600 international passengers’ during peak hours taking the annual passenger capacity to 2.6 million.

The modernized airport terminal will be 4-Star GRIHA rated energy-efficient building and the interiors will reflect the art and culture of Gujarat. The Foundation Stone for the extension of Terminal Building of Surat Airport was laid by Prime Minister Modi on 30th January 2019. The new world-class terminal building of the airport will give impetus to the growth of the region.

Worth mentioning that last year, the Cabinet gave its approval for the development of a new Greenfield Airport at Hirasar, Rajkot in Gujarat at an estimated cost of Rs 1,405 crore. The existing airport at Rajkot is severely land constrained having only 236 acres (approx.) of land and situated in the heart of the city. The government has already identified the  equired land for the new airport and has also requested Airports Authority of India to develop, operate and maintain the new airport.

 

 

Free Online Safety Management System (SMS)Training by Aviation Safety India

Dear Sir/Madam,

Greetings from Aviation Safety Management Society of India (ASMSI).

Aviation Safety Management Society of India is an All India Registered, Not for Profit Society dedicated for promotion of Aviation and Aviation Safety in the Country. ASMSI is fortunate to have a vast pool of highly accomplished Aviation Professionals of repute as its distinguished Members. ASMSI has been working relentlessly to enhance the Aviation Safety environments in the country through spread of knowledge and awareness.

Safety Management System is a very effective and proven management system to identify hazards in a proactive manner and to ensure that hazards do not turn into accidents, incidents, through timely elimination of hazards.

SMS was introduced in India for the first time on 20 Jul 10 by DGCA through the issue of a CAR. Since then DGCA has been making concerted efforts to ensure that the SMS is implemented in letter and spirit. In some recent audits by DGCA, it was observed that the implementation of SMS is lacking on many fronts and it is not being taken seriously by most of the Operators. The lack of proper implementation of SMS was also highlighted by the Honorable Minister of Civil Aviation during his briefing to the lawmakers in Parliament.

The Scope of SMS includes all the personnel of the operator right from the CEO downwards to lowest level including employees from Finance, HR, Admin and marketing etc. Every employee of the Company should be sensitized to the concept of Safety Management System commensurate with their role and responsibilities. Hence, everyone in an Aviation Company should be trained on SMS.

Most of the Operators have no choice but to train their employees i.e. Pilots, Cabin Crew, Accountable Executives/Managers, Chief, Deputy  Chief of Flight Safety and Safety Manager etc. on SMS as mandated by DGCA. Other employees of the Company obviously remain ignorant about the SMS in absence of any training.

The Management of the Aviation Organisations should appreciate that SMS is a very useful system to promote safety and hence, it would serve the interest of the Company towards maintenance of a safe operating environment. It needs to be remembered that Accidents are bad for business and reputation and can impact very heavily on the finances and survivability of a Company.

Keeping in mind the importance of SMS towards safety and the reluctance of the Operators to get the SMS training done for all their personnel due to financial considerations, ASMSI has decided to conduct Online  SMS training of all the personnel of a Company free of cost.

Safety Management System is not only essential for Aviation Industry but also equally important for all other enterprises. ASMSI will be happy to conduct free SMS training whoever wishes to benefit from this training across the country. Our mission is to spread the message of Safety to make India even Greater.

Kindly do not hesitate and feel free to avail this opportunity to get all your personnel trained on SMS, without incurring any expenditure. Training of all your personnel on SMS will go a long way in enhancing safety of your operations and promoting safety culture in your Organisation.

Please Remember that Knowledge and Awareness are Key to Safety.

Thanking you

With warm Regards

Air Commodore BS Siwach AVSM YSM VM (Veteran) -(9871251590)

Director General

Aviation Safety Management Society of India

New Delhi.www.aviationsafetyindia.com

AirAsia’s Problems Grow as India Minister Hints at Local Shutdown

AirAsia Group Bhd. is closing its affiliate operations in India, the local aviation minister said over the weekend, a comment his office later suggested was taken out of context. “AirAsia’s shop is anyway shutting down,” Hardeep Singh Puri said in televised comments that were widely circulated on social media. “Their parent company has problems.”

A spokesman for AirAsia India, which is majority owned by Indian conglomerate Tata Group, declined to comment. A spokesman for the civil aviation ministry said Puri’s comments were taken out of context and he had immediately clarified them.

AirAsia, once the poster child of a low-cost airline revolution in Asia, is seeking to raise as much as 2.5 billion ringgit ($600 million) by the end of the year as the coronavirus disrupts travel globally. The Subang, Malaysia-based budget carrier posted its biggest-ever quarterly loss in August and has said it is evaluating its operations in Japan. A Reuters report earlier this year flagged its Indian operations may also be under review.

AirAsia is closing its operations in Japan as it grapples with pandemic-related restrictions on global travel, local media reported last week. Chief Executive Officer Tony Fernandes later confirmed that exiting Japan is a possibility. AirAsia India started flying in 2014 with a promise to break even in four months. But it’s never made money in what is one of the world’s most difficult markets, where high fuel taxes and cut-throat fares often make operations unprofitable. The carrier, which has a market share of 6.8%, employs more than 3,000 people in the country.

Tata Sons is reviewing the joint venture with AirAsia, and is in talks to buy out the 49% stake the Malaysian firm holds in the Indian affiliate, the Times of India newspaper separately reported on Monday, citing an unnamed source. AirAsia isn’t keen on infusing more funds into the venture and instead wants it to take on debt, according to the report.

India’s aviation regulator suspended two senior executives at AirAsia India in August after a pilot claimed there were safety lapses at the airline. Indian officials are also investigating Fernandes and other officials for allegedly paying bribes to influence local policy.

Expect domestic passenger traffic to reach pre-COVID level by year end: Hardeep Puri

Hardeep Singh Puri said the daily domestic traffic has reached 1.76 lakh passengers from 30,000 passengers when the civil aviation operations resumed on May 25.
Civil Aviation Minister Hardeep Singh Puri Saturday said domestic passenger traffic could reach the pre COVID-19 level by the end of current year.

He said the daily domestic traffic has reached 1.76 lakh passengers from 30,000 passengers when the civil aviation operations resumed on May 25 following a two-month gap due to the pandemic.

“On May 25, we resumed civil aviation operations and at that time, there were around 30,000 passengers. Today, I received data as per which there were 1.76 lakh passengers yesterday. We are going to achieve almost the pre-COVID level during the period between Diwali and the end of this year,” said Puri.

He also said that a meeting of airlines, Airport Authority of India and other stakeholders would be called to discuss how more flights could be introduced from Chandigarh city.

“We will see to increase connectivity from Chandigarh within our existing system,” he said.

Meanwhile, Puri inaugurated two passenger boarding bridges (PBB) at the Chandigarh International Airport.

Costing Rs 10.5 crore, the tunnel of these passenger boarding bridges were manufactured at Bengaluru, said an official release.

With this, the number of bridges at the airport reached five.

Ajay Kumar, the CEO of Chandigarh International Airport Limited said the PBBs are now available for passengers and almost 90 per cent of the total passenger traffic shall be making use of it.

Are authorities waiting for a disaster at Patna airport?

HIGHLIGHTS

  • Runway of Patna airport shorter than Kozhikode airport
  • No increase in Runway size in last five years, no plan to relocate
  • No safety audit of the size of Patna airport’s runway by the AAI

The crash of the Air India Express plane at Kozhikode airport on August 7 that killed 19 people raised a serious question about the safety of Indian airports. According to reports, the mishap took place when the plane overshot the ideal landing point and overran the runway.

This tragic incident brought the spotlight back on risky airports in India and some of them have really short runways. The Jaiprakash Narayan International Airport at Patna is a case in point.

To know about the flow of traffic, size of runway and security audit of the runway at Patna Airport, India Today filed a Right to Information (RTI) query with the Airports Authority of India (AAI).

We inquired about the length of the runway at Patna Airport. In response, the AAI Patna said, “Length of the Runway of Patna [is] 2072 M”.

We also asked if it has been increased in the last five years. The AAI responded “No, this has not been increased in the last five years.”

Boeing 737s and Airbus A320s are majorly the types of passenger planes that fly in and out of Patna airport. So, we asked, what is the ideal runway length for the safe landing of Boeing 737s and Airbus A320s? AAI refused to answer it saying “Data is Pertaining to Airline Operators / Agencies.”

As per data from the Federal Aviation Administration, United States, the adequate runway length required for a safe landing of such Aircraft is 2,300 metres. This means that the 2,072 available at Patna is not adequate. It is even less than the length of Kozhikode airport’s tabletop runway which is about 2,700 metres.

Answering the question if the Patna Airport has done any safety audit of the length of the Airport the AAI said, “No, such type of audit [has] not [been] done.”

If you board a flight from somewhere to Patna, it is quite normal to see how pilots have to brake violently. It seems small runway makes smooth landing for big aircrafts difficult.

India Today also asked if there is any plan to shift the present Patna Airport somewhere else. The AAI has no such information. It said, “This information is not known to this office.”

This is in contrast to news reports, which comes at frequent intervals that ministry of civil aviation plans to relocate Patna airport to Bihta.

We also asked for five year data on the number of landings at the Patna Airport. The AAI said, “It is to bring to your kind notice that as per Section 3.9.1 of MATS (Manual of Air Traffic Services) Part I, issued by ED (ATM), CHQ, AAI; ‘Air Traffic Returns’ are preserved / retained for a period of 3 Years only. Kindly find below in the Table, the total number of landing (Arrivals only) on yearly basis-”

Annual year Total number of landings (Arrivals only)

2019-2020 17,269

2018-2019 15,958

2017-2018 12,099

This shows that in the last two years, the number of planes landing at the Patna Airport went up by 5,170, from 12,099 arrivals in 2017-18 to 17,269 in year 2019-20. In the last one year itself the number of flights went up by 1,311.

Substantial increase in air traffic, a shorter-than-recommended runway, and no plan to relocate the airport to somewhere else paint a scary picture of the Patna airport. It seems that Patna airport is living in the past and an ideal candidate for a disaster in the making.

From Air Bubble Pacts to RCS-UDAN, Here’s Aviation Ministry’s Revival Plan for Industry

COVID-19 has put a hard brake on the aviation industry across the globe as the of contamination has stopped passengers from taking a flight and going out. With India announcing nation wide lockdown from March 23 and other countries banning entry and exit from the country, movement of people was restricted completely for at least a couple of months.

However, India was among the only country to announce a repatriation drive called ‘Mission Vande Bharat’ bringing back lakhs of stranded Indians from various countries despite flight ban. Later, the government announced Air Bubble agreement with various countries to ease the travelling.

Not only this, government has undertaken various measures to revive the slowdown in the aviation industry and here’s a list of all the efforts made to reduce the impact of the pandemic on the aviation sector.

– India was among the first few countries to band and then restart the domestic air services, albeit in a calibrated manner. Initially only one third (33%) of the summer schedule 2020 was allowed to be operated which was subsequently increased to 45% on 26 Jun 2020 and then to 60% on 02 Sep 2020. Facilities like booking middle seat for social distancing, providing PPE kits onboard and more were taken to ensure less contamination in the aircraft.

– Operation of Regional Connectivity Scheme (RCS) – UDAN flights were allowed without the above-mentioned restrictions. Many cities which were earlier not in the aviation map were added to enhance regional connectivity and further more airports are in process of completion.

– Exclusive air-links or Air Bubbles have been established with countries which include Afghanistan, Bahrain, Canada, France, Germany, Qatar, Maldives, UAE, UK and USA. These are temporary arrangements aimed at restarting international passenger services while regular international flights remain suspended due to COVID-19.

– During the pandemic, Delhi’s IGI airport emerged as a hub for cargo transport in the country. Not only Delhi, but all airlines and airports functioned as cargo terminals whenever required transporting essential materials not only for domestic purposes but to international destinations too.

– Government earlier announced that India will emerge as a hub for Aircraft Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) services and keeping in line the same, GST rates were reduced to 5% for domestic MRO services.

– In a major change of Route rationalisation, Civil Aviation Ministry coordinated with the Indian Air Force for efficient airspace management over the Indian airspace. This resulted in shorter routes and reduced fuel burn for civil aircrafts.

– Government also announced Mission Vande Bharat, one of its largest kind of repatriation drive to bring back stranded Indians on a chargeable basis, giving airlines like Air India, Spicejet, Indigo and GoAir and opportunity to operate some of their flights on international routes.

India has one of the better air safety indicators in the world, says Puri

India has one of the better air safety indicators in the world as aircraft accidents in the country in 2019 were just 0.82 per million flights as compared to the global average of 3.02, said Civil Aviation Minister

On August 7, an Air India Express flight from Dubai with 190 people overshot the tabletop runway during landing at the Kozhikode airport in heavy rain and fell into a valley 35 feet below and broke into two, killing 18 people, including the pilots.

Puri said on Twitter: “Regardless of the motivated narrative on India’s record, I would reiterate that we have one of the better safety records/indicators in the world.”

Aircraft accidents in India in 2019 were just 0.82 per million flights as compared to the global average of 3.02, he noted.

“This can be understood better when we compare it to corresponding indicator in India which was 2.8 per million flights in 2014,” he stated.

We take all measures to ensure aviation safety, he said.

The Ministry of Civil Aviation and Airports Authority of India have taken positive steps to further strengthen the infrastructure in the country, he added.

About 1000 air traffic controllers have been recruited during the last three years taking their number to 3,263, Puri stated.

“Number of air misses has considerably come down from 35 in 2018 to 18 in 2019. There have only been 3 such cases in 2020 till now,” he mentioned.

Parliament on Tuesday passed a bill that seeks to improve India’s ratings and provide statutory status to regulatory institutions, including the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA).

“In the amended Aircraft Bill as passed by Rajya Sabha today, the maximum penalty for any act in contravention of the provisions of the Rule has been enhanced from Rs 10 lakhs to Rs 1 crore. Further, the regulator has been empowered to impose the penalty,” Puri said in a tweet.

“Some Hon’bl members enquired during RS session today as to why the regulator had not imposed fines on operators despite finding deficiencies in the past. I want to inform my esteemed colleagues that power to impose penalty,” Puri said in a tweet.

“Some Hon’bl members enquired during RS session today as to why the regulator had not imposed fines on operators despite finding deficiencies in the past. I want to inform my esteemed colleagues that power to impose penalties vested with Hon’ble courts before today’s amendment,” he said in another tweet.

Accident and Serious Incident Reports: Helicopters

Accidents and Incidents involving Helicopters/Rotary Wing Aircraft

  • A109, vicinity London Heliport London UK, 2013 (On 16 January 2013, an Augusta 109E helicopter positioning by day on an implied (due to adverse weather conditions) SVFR clearance collided with a crane attached to a tall building under construction. It and associated debris fell to street level and the pilot and a pedestrian were killed and several others on the ground injured. It was concluded that the pilot had not seen the crane or seen it too late to avoid whilst flying by visual reference in conditions which had become increasingly challenging. The Investigation recommended improvements in the regulatory context in which the accident had occurred.)
  • A139 / A30B, Ottawa Canada, 2014 (On 5 June 2014, an AW139 about to depart from its Ottawa home base on a positioning flight exceeded its clearance limit and began to hover taxi towards the main runway as an A300 was about to touch down on it. The TWR controller immediately instructed the helicopter to stop which it did, just clear of the runway. The A300 reached taxi speed just prior to the intersection. The Investigation attributed the error to a combination of distraction and expectancy and noted that the AW139 pilot had not checked actual or imminent runway occupancy prior to passing his clearance limit.)
  • A139, vicinity Sky Shuttle Heliport Hong Kong China, 2010 (On 3 July 2010, an AW139 helicopter was climbing through 350 feet over Victoria Harbour Hong Kong just after takeoff when the tail rotor detached. A transition to autorotation was accomplished and a controlled ditching followed. All occupants were rescued but some sustained minor injuries. The failure was attributed entirely to manufacturing defects but no corrective manufacturer or regulatory action was taken until two similar accidents had occurred in Qatar (non-fatal) and Brazil (fatal) the following year and two interim Safety Recommendations were issued from this Investigation after which a comprehensive review of the manufacturing process led to numerous changes.)
  • A169, Leicester UK, 2018 (On 27 October 2018, a single pilot Augusta Westland AW169 lifted off from within the Leicester City Football Club Stadium, but after a failure of the tail rotor control system, a loss of yaw control occurred a few hundred feet above ground. The helicopter began to descend with a high rotation rate and soon afterward impacted the ground and almost immediately caught fire, which prevented those onboard surviving. An Investigation is being conducted by the UK AAIB.)
  • A319 / AS32, vicinity Marseille France, 2016 (On 27 June 2016, an Airbus A319 narrowly avoided a mid-air collision with an AS532 Cougar helicopter whose single transponder had failed earlier whilst conducting a local pre-delivery test flight whilst both were positioning visually as cleared to land at Marseille and after the helicopter had also temporarily disappeared from primary radar. Neither aircraft crew had detected the other prior to their tracks crossing at a similar altitude. The Investigation attributed the conflict to an inappropriate ATC response to the temporary loss of radar contact with the helicopter aggravated by inaccurate position reports and non-compliance with the aerodrome circuit altitude by the helicopter crew.)
  • A320 / A139 vicinity Zurich Switzerland, 2012 (On 29 May 2012, a British Airways Airbus A320 departing Zürich and in accordance with its SID in a climbing turn received and promptly and correctly actioned a TCAS RA ‘CLIMB’. The conflict which caused this was with an AW 139 also departing Zürich IFR in accordance with a SID but, as this aircraft was only equipped with a TAS to TCAS 1 standard, the crew independently determined from their TA that they should descend and did so. The conflict, in Class ‘C’ airspace, was attributed to inappropriate clearance issue by the TWR controller and their inappropriate separation monitoring thereafter.)
  • AS32 / B734, Aberdeen UK, 2000 (For reasons that were not established, a Super Puma helicopter being air tested and in the hover at about 30 feet agl near the active runway at Aberdeen assumed that the departure clearance given by GND was a take off clearance and moved into the hover over the opposite end of the runway at the same time as a Boeing 737 was taking off. The 737 saw the helicopter ahead and made a high speed rejected take off, stopping approximately 100 metres before reaching the position of the helicopter which had by then moved off the runway still hovering.)
  • AS32, en-route, North Sea Norway, 1998 (On 20 October 1998, in the North Sea, an Eurocopter AS332L Super Puma operated by Norsk HeliKopter AS, experienced engine failure with autorotation and subsequent lost of height. The crew misidentified the malfunctioning engine and reduced the power of the remaining serviceable engine. However, the mistake was realised quickly enough for the crew to recover control of the helicopter.)
  • AS32, en-route, North Sea UK, 2002 (On 28th February 2002, an Aerospatiale AS332L Super Puma helicopter en route approximately 70 nm northeast of Scatsa, Shetland Islands was in the vicinity of a storm cell when a waterspout was observed about a mile abeam. Soon afterwards, violent pitch, roll and yaw with significant negative and positive ‘g’ occurred. Recovery to normal flight was achieved after 15 seconds and after a control check, the flight was completed. After flight, all five tail rotor blades and tail pylon damage were discovered. It was established that this serious damage was the result of contact between the blades and the pylon.)
  • AS32, en-route, near Peterhead Scotland UK, 2009 (On 1 April 2009, the flight crew of a Bond Helicopters’ Eurocopter AS332 L2 Super Puma en route from the Miller Offshore Platform to Aberdeen at an altitude of 2000 feet lost control of their helicopter when a sudden and catastrophic failure of the main rotor gearbox occurred and, within less than 20 seconds, the hub with the main rotor blades attached separated from the helicopter causing it to fall into the sea at a high vertical speed The impact destroyed the helicopter and all 16 occupants were killed. Seventeen Safety Recommendations were made as a result of the investigation.)
  • AS3B, en-route, northern North Sea UK, 2008 (On 22 February 2008, a Eurocopter AS332 L2 Super Puma flying from an offshore oil platform to Aberdeen was struck by lightning. There was no apparent consequence and so, although this event required a landing as soon as possible, the commander decided to continue the remaining 165nm to the planned destination which was achieved uneventfully. Main rotor blade damage including some beyond repairable limits was subsequently discovered. The Investigation noted evidence indicating that this helicopter type had a relatively high propensity to sustain lightning strikes but noted that, despite the risk of damage, there was currently no adverse safety trend.)
  • AS3B, vicinity Den Helder Netherlands, 2006 (On 21 November 2006, the crew of a Bristow Eurocopter AS332 L2 making an unscheduled passenger flight from an offshore platform to Den Helder in night VMC decided to ditch their aircraft after apparent malfunction of an engine and the flight controls were perceived as rendering it unable to safely complete the flight. All 17 occupants survived but the evacuation was disorganised and both oversight of the operation by and the actions of the crew were considered to have been inappropriate in various respects. Despite extensive investigation, no technical fault which would have rendered it unflyable could be confirmed.)
  • AS3B, vicinity Sumburgh Airport Shetland Islands UK, 2013 (On 23 August 2013, the crew of a Eurocopter AS332 L2 Super Puma helicopter making a non-precision approach to runway 09 at Sumburgh with the AP engaged in 3-axes mode descended below MDA without visual reference and after exposing the helicopter to vortex ring conditions were unable to prevent a sudden onset high rate of descent followed by sea surface impact and rapid inversion of the floating helicopter. Four of the 18 occupants died and three were seriously injured. The Investigation found no evidence of contributory technical failure and attributed the accident to inappropriate flight path control by the crew.)
  • AS50 / PA32, en-route, Hudson River NJ USA, 2009 (On August 8, 2009 a privately operated PA32 and a Eurocopter AS350BA helicopter being operated by Liberty Helicopters on a public transport sightseeing flight collided in VMC over the Hudson River near Hoboken, New Jersey whilst both operating under VFR. The three occupants of the PA32, which was en route from Wings Field PA to Ocean City NJ, and the six occupants of the helicopter, which had just left the West 30th Street Heliport, were killed and both aircraft received substantially damaged.)
  • AS50, Dalamot Norway, 2011 (On 4 July 2011, an Airlift Eurocopter AS 350 making a passenger charter flight to a mountain cabin in day VMC appeared to suddenly depart controlled flight whilst making a tight right turn during positioning to land at the destination landing site and impacted terrain soon afterwards. The helicopter was destroyed by the impact and ensuing fire and all five occupants were fatally injured. The subsequent investigation came to the conclusion that the apparently abrupt manoeuvring may have led to an encounter with ‘servo transparency’ at a height from which the pilot was unable to recover before impact occurred.)
  • AS50, en-route, Hawaii USA, 2005 (On 23 September 2005, an AS350 helicopter, operated by Heli USA Airways, crashed into the sea off Hawaii following loss of control associated with flight into adverse weather conditions.)
  • AS50, manoeuvring, East River New York USA, 2018 (On 11 March 2018, an Airbus AS350 engine failed during a commercial sightseeing flight and autorotation was initiated. The pilot then noticed that the floor-mounted fuel cut-off had been operated by part of the tether system of one of the five passengers but there was insufficient time to restore power. On water contact, the automatic floatation system operated asymmetrically and the helicopter submerged before the occupants could evacuate. Only the pilot was able to release his harness and escape because the unapproved adapted passenger harnesses had no quick release mechanism. The Investigation found systemic inadequacy of the operator’s safety management system.)
  • AS55, vicinity Fairview Alberta Canada, 1999 (On 28th April 1999, an AS-355 helicopter suffered an in-flight fire attributed to an electrical fault which had originated from a prior maintenance error undetected during incomplete pre-flight inspections. The aircraft carried out an immediate landing allowing evacuation before the aircraft was destroyed by an intense fire.)
  • AS65, vicinity North Morecambe Platform Irish Sea UK, 2006 (On 27 December 2006, an AS365 Dauphin 2, operated by CHC Scotia, crashed into the sea adjacent to a gas platform in Morecambe Bay, UK, at night, following loss of control.)
  • B412, vicinity Karlsborg Sweden, 2003 (On 25 March 2003, the crew of a Bell 412 lost control of the aircraft as a result of pilot mishandling associated with the development of a Vortex Ring State.)
  • D150 / H500, London UK, 2007 (On 5 October 2007, a loss of separation occurred between a Hughes 369 helicopter and a Jodel D150. The incident occurred outside controlled airspace, in VMC, and the estimated vertical separation as the Jodel took avoiding action by descending, was assessed by both pilots to be less than 50 feet.)
  • D328 / R44, Bern Switzerland, 2012 (On 2 June 2012, a Dornier 328 and a commercially-operated Robinson R44 helicopter came into close proximity within the airport perimeter whilst both were departing from Bern in VMC as cleared. The Investigation attributed the conflict to inappropriate issue of clearances by the controller in a context of an absence of both a defined final approach and take off area and fixed departure routes to the three designated departure points.)
  • EC25, en-route, 20nm east of Aberdeen UK, 2012 (On 10 May 2012, the crew of a Eurocopter EC225 LP on a flight from Aberdeen to an offshore platform received an indication that the main gearbox (MGB) lubrication system had failed. Shortly after selecting the emergency lubrication system, that also indicated failure and the crew responded in accordance with the QRH drill to “land immediately” by carrying out a successful controlled ditching. The ongoing investigation has found that there had been a mechanical failure of the MGB but that the emergency lubrication system had, contrary to indications, been functioning normally.)
  • EC25, en-route, 32nm southwest of Sumburgh UK, 2012 (On 22 October 2012, the crew of a Eurocopter EC225 LP on a flight from Aberdeen to an offshore platform received an indication that the main gearbox (MGB) lubrication system had failed. Shortly after selecting the emergency lubrication system, that system also indicated failure and the crew responded in accordance with the QRH drill to “land immediately” by carrying out a successful controlled ditching. The ongoing investigation has found that there had been a mechanical failure within the MGB but that the emergency lubrication system had, contrary to indications, been functioning normally.)
  • EC25, vicinity Bergen Norway, 2016 (On 29 April 2016, an Airbus EC225 Super Puma main rotor detached without warning en-route to Bergen. Control was lost and it crashed and was destroyed. Rotor detachment was attributed to undetected development of metal fatigue in the same gearbox component which caused an identical 2009 accident to a variant of the same helicopter type. Despite this previous accident, the failure mode involved had not been properly understood or anticipated. The investigation identifies significant lessons to be learned related to gearbox design, risk assessment, fatigue evaluation, gearbox condition monitoring, type certification and continued airworthiness, which may also be valid for other helicopter types.)
  • EC25, vicinity ETAP Central offshore platform, North Sea UK (On 18 February 2009, the crew of Eurocopter EC225 LP Super Puma attempting to make an approach to a North Sea offshore platform in poor visibility at night lost meaningful visual reference and a sea impact followed. All occupants escaped from the helicopter and were subsequently rescued. The investigation concluded that the accident probably occurred because of the effects of oculogravic and somatogravic illusions combined with both pilots being focused on the platform and not monitoring the flight instruments.)
  • EC25, Åsgård B Platform North Sea, 2012 (On 12 January 2012, the crew of an EC 225LP helicopter were unable to prevent it almost departing the helideck at the offshore platform where it had just made a normal touch down at night after an en route diversion prompted by a partial hydraulic failure. An emergency evacuation was ordered and ground crew intervention prevented further helicopter movement. A component in the left main landing gear brake unit was found to have failed due to a manufacturing fault. Emergency Regulatory action for the helicopter type followed in respect of both the airworthiness and operational issues highlighted by the Investigation.)
  • EC35, Sollihøgda Norway, 2014 (On 14 January 2014, the experienced pilot of an EC 135 HEMS aircraft lost control as a result of a collision with unseen and difficult to visually detect power lines as it neared the site of a road accident at Sollihøgda to which it was responding which damaged the main rotor and led to it falling rapidly from about 80 feet agl. The helicopter was destroyed by the impact which killed two of the three occupants and seriously injured the third. The Investigation identified opportunities to improve both obstacle documentation / pilot proactive obstacle awareness and on site emergency communications.)
  • EC35, vicinity Glasgow City Heliport UK, 2013 (On 29 November 2013, control of an Airbus Helicopters EC135 undertaking a night VMC night for policing purposes was lost after both engines flamed out following fuel starvation. The subsequent crash killed the three occupants and seven on the ground, seriously injuring eleven others. The Investigation found that although the pilot had acknowledged low fuel warnings after both fuel transfer pumps had been switched off, the helicopter had not then been landed within 10 minutes as required. No evidence of any relevant airworthiness defects was found and without FDR/CVR data, a full explanation of the accident circumstances was not possible.)
  • EC55, en-route, Hong Kong China, 2003 (On 26 August 2003, at night, a Eurocopter EC155, operated by Hong Kong Government Flight Service (GFS), performing a casualty evacuation mission (casevac), impacted the elevated terrain in Tung Chung Gap near Hong Kong International airport.)
  • F100 / EC45, vicinity Bern Switzerland, 2012 (On 24 May 2012, a Fokker 100 descending visual downwind to land at Berne and an EC145 helicopter transiting the Bern CTR (Class ‘D’ airspace) VFR came within 0.7 nm horizontally and 75 ft vertically despite early traffic advice having been given to both aircraft. The Investigation attributed the conflict to the failure of the F100 crew to follow either their initial TCAS RA or a subsequent revised one and noted that although STCA was installed at Berne it had been disabled “many years before”.)
  • H500 / D150, en-route, North of London UK, 2007 (On 5 October 2007, a loss of separation occurred between a Hughes 369 helicopter and a Jodel D150. The incident occurred outside controlled airspace, in VMC, and the estimated vertical separation as the Jodel took avoiding action by descending, was assessed by both pilots to be less than 50 feet.)
  • NIM / AS32, vicinity RAF Kinloss UK, 2006 (On 17 October 2006, at night, in low cloud and poor visibility conditions in the vicinity of Kinloss Airfield UK, a loss of separation event occurred between an RAF Nimrod MR2 aircraft and a civilian AS332L Puma helicopter.)
  • P28A / S76, Humberside UK 2009 (On 26 September 2009, a Piper PA28-140 flown by an experienced pilot was about to touch down after a day VMC approach about a mile behind an S76 helicopter which was also categorised as ‘Light’ for Wake Vortex purposes rolled uncontrollably to the right in the flare and struck the ground inverted seriously injuring the pilot. The Investigation noted existing informal National Regulatory Authority guidance material already suggested that light aircraft pilots might treat ‘Light’ helicopters as one category higher when on approach and recommended that this advice be more widely promulgated.)
  • S61, vicinity Bournemouth UK, 2002 (On 15 July 2002, a Sikorsky S-61 helicopter operated by Bristow suffered a catastrophic engine failure and fire. After an emergency landing and evacuation, the aircraft was destroyed by an intense fire.)
  • S61, vicinity Bødo Norway, 2008 (On 24 February 2008, a Sikorsky S-61N being operated by British International Helicopters on a passenger flight from Værøy to Bødo attempted a visual approach at destination in day IMC and came close to unseen terrain before accepting an offer of assistance from ATC to achieve an ILS approach to runway 07 without further event. None of the 18 occupants were injured.)
  • S76, Peasmarsh East Sussex UK, 2012 (On 3 May 2012, a Sikorsky S76C operating a passenger flight to a private landing site at night discontinued an initial approach because of lack of visual reference in an unlit environment and began to position for another. The commander became spatially disorientated and despite a number of EGPWS Warnings, continued manoeuvring until ground impact was only narrowly avoided – the minimum recorded height was 2 feet +/- 2 feet. An uneventful diversion followed. The Investigation recommended a review of the regulations that allowed descent below MSA for landing when flying in IMC but not on a published approach procedure.)
  • S76, en-route, southeast of Lagos Nigeria, 2016 (On 3 February 2016, a Sikorsky S76C crew on a flight from an offshore platform to Lagos was ditched when the crew believed that it was no longer possible to complete their intended flight to Lagos. After recovering the helicopter from the seabed, the Investigation concluded that the crew had failed to perform a routine standard procedure after takeoff – resetting the compass to ‘slave rather than ‘free’ mode – and had then failed to recognise that this was the cause of the flight path control issues which they were experiencing or disconnect the autopilot and fly the aircraft manually.)
  • S76, vicinity Lagos Nigeria, 2015 (On 12 August 2015, a Sikorsky S76C crew on a flight from an offshore platform to Lagos lost control of their aircraft after a sudden uncommanded pitch up, yaw and roll began and 12 seconds later it crashed into water in a suburb of Lagos killing both pilots and four of the 10 passengers. The Investigation concluded that the upset had been caused by a critical separation within the main rotor cyclic control system resulting from undetected wear at a point where there was no secondary mechanical locking system such as a locking pin or a wire lock to maintain system integrity.)
  • S76, vicinity Moosonee ON Canada, 2013 (On 31 May 2013 the crew of an S76A helicopter positioning for a HEMS detail took off VFR into a dark night environment and lost control as a low level turn was initiated and did not recover. The helicopter was destroyed and the four occupants killed. The Investigation found that the crew had little relevant experience and were not “operationally ready” to conduct a night VFR take off into an area of total darkness. Significant deficiencies at the Operator and in respect of the effectiveness of its Regulatory oversight were identified as having been a significant context for the accident.)
  • S92, West Franklin Wellhead Platform North Sea, 2016 (On 28 December 2016, yaw control was lost during touchdown of a Sikorsky S92A landing on a North Sea offshore platform and it almost fell into the sea. The Investigation found that the loss of control was attributable to the failure of the Tail Rotor Pitch Change Shaft bearing which precipitated damage to the associated control servo. It was also found that despite HUMS monitoring being in place, it had been ineffective in proactively alerting the operator to the earlier stages of progressive bearing deterioration which could have ensured the helicopter was grounded for rectification before the accident occurred.)
  • S92, en-route, east of St John’s Newfoundland Canada, 2009 (On 12 March 2009, a Sikorsky S-92A crew heading offshore from St. John’s, Newfoundland declared an emergency and began a return after total loss of main gear box oil pressure but lost control during an attempted ditching. The Investigation found that all oil had been lost after two main gear box securing bolts had sheared. It was noted that ambiguity had contributed to crew misdiagnosis the cause and that the ditching had been mishandled. Sea States beyond the capability of Emergency Flotation Systems and the limited usefulness of personal Supplemental Breathing Systems in cold water were identified as Safety Issues.)
  • S92, northeast of Aberdeen UK, 2018 (On 23 August 2018, a low experience Sikorsky S92 First Officer undergoing line training made a visual transit between two North Sea offshore platforms but completed an approach to the wrong one. The platform radio operator alerted the crew to their error and the helicopter then flew to the correct platform. The Investigation attributed the error primarily to the inadequate performance of both pilots on what should have been a straightforward short visual flight but particularly highlighted the apparent failure of the Training Captain to fully recognise the challenges of the flight involved when training and acting as Pilot Monitoring.)